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Abstract 
 
We analyze carbon-related BAMs (focused on imports) as potential instruments to reduce emissions 
leakage. We combine an approach from international trade law with an economic approach. For the 
legal aspect we discuss the elements needed to include carbon-related BAMs within the current GATT 
and WTO frameworks. For the economic aspect, we assess the effects of leakage and of BAMs to 
tackle it within an optimal climate policy model and a general equilibrium model. We find that the 
design and implementation of these BAMs would be difficult to bring in compliance with current 
international trade law and it may entail high transaction costs. Moreover, we observe that the 
severity of leakage may be amplified by international trade and that BAMs help in reducing it. Finally, 
we find that welfare effects of introducing carbon-related BAMs are ambiguous and thus they may not 
represent a credible threat to involve other actors in the international climate regime. 
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1. Introduction 
 
There is a strong link between international environmental policy making and trade. In 
particular, this link is apparent whenever trade measures are invoked as instruments to cope 
with the international environmental regulation involved - e.g. the Montreal Protocol. We find 
that border adjustment measures (BAMs) are nowadays one of the most discussed instruments 
in this respect. For instance, in the last few decades, a number of environment-related border 
adjustment practices have been introduced. BAMs can be applied both by applying internal 
taxes to imports and by giving tax rebates to exports. However, taxes and other fiscal 
measures are not the only domestic policy measures used for border adjustment. There are 
also non-fiscal internal measures, such as standards, regulations and requirements, which 
countries may apply to imported products at the border. 
For instance, in 1986 the US adopted a Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, 
which, inter alia, introduced export and import border adjustment for an excise tax on certain 
chemicals used as inputs for producing chemical derivative products (Biermann and Brohm, 
2005). Another example of adjustment measures for environmental taxes is export and import 
border adjustment of an excise tax on certain ozone-depleting chemicals, introduced by the 
US in 1989 to meet its obligations under the Montreal Protocol. The taxed chemicals were 
either present in the final product or were themselves a finished product.  
In the context of climate policy, BAMs are currently viewed as a way to address 
competitiveness and carbon leakage concerns associated with a cap-and-trade or any other 
emission reduction system which imposes additional costs on domestic producers. 
Furthermore, BAMs may be used to address one of the prominent issues related to climate 
policy namely, emissions leakage. The IPCC defines leakage as the increase in CO2 emissions 
outside the countries taking domestic mitigation action divided by the reduction in the 
emissions of these countries (IPCC, 2007). Several studies have estimated the size of this 
leakage.  The range in estimations is large and uncertainties seem to be high. But most 
analyses conclude that the efforts of Annex B countries, which have committed themselves to 
reduce GHG emissions in the Kyoto Protocol, cause a leakage between 5% and 20% in Non-
Annex B countries (IPCC, 2007).  
As it was noted in Paltsev (2001) there are several sources of leakage, but two are of 
particular relevance for our study, the first one is linked to the decrease of energy 
consumption coming from the regions which are taking commitment in CO2 abatement, this 
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decrease of fossil energy consumption lead to a lower world energy prices which induces in 
regions which are not taking into account any commitment an increase of energy consumption 
and therefore an increase in CO2 emissions. The second source is due to trade effects. The 
higher cost of fossil energy leads to an increase of production prices in energy-intensive 
industries in countries, which are implementing a climate policy, this loss of competitiveness 
induces an increase of imports from other countries and higher emissions level. 
BAMs may be applied to either imports, exports or both. Import-BAMs for carbon taxes or 
carbon-related requirements level the playing field between domestic and foreign firms in the 
home market by imposing the same costs on imports, as the costs imposed by climate 
legislation on domestic products. Export-BAMs eliminate competitive disadvantages of 
domestic firms in the world markets by reimbursing carbon costs when they export their 
products. Putting domestic and foreign producers on an equal footing prevents relocation of 
emission-intensive production to countries without emissions restrictions and supports the 
efficiency of climate change mitigation actions.  
There are prominent examples of BAMs applied to climate policy in European Union and the 
USA. One of the earlier drafts of amendments to the EU ETS Directive contained a more 
definitive proposal on allowance requirements for EU importers. The so-called FAIR (a future 
allowance import requirement) program would include imports in the EU ETS beginning 
from 31 December 2014. The US Waxman-Markey bill, which passed a vote in the House of 
Representatives in June 2009, provides for inclusion of imports to the US cap-and-trade 
starting from 2020. It was suggested that US importers would have to buy US “international 
reserve allowances” to offset lower energy and carbon costs of manufacturing covered goods. 
The design of these border adjustments is still in process of elaboration. 
However, a potential problem with the inclusion of carbon-related BAMs on international 
climate policy is that the unilateral use of carbon-related import restrictions risks triggering 
retaliation by trading partners. Moreover, it raises questions about the consistency of such 
trade measures with countries’ obligations under the WTO. The WTO status is not clear on 
measures imposed not directly on products but on the methods by which they were produced.1 
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 See Holzer (2010a and 2010b) for a good overview of potential challenges and opportunities of 
climate-related BAMs (both in imports and exports) as instruments for international climate policy. 
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The objective of this paper is to analyze carbon-related BAMs as potential instruments to 
reduce emissions leakage. In this paper, we focus our analysis only on BAMs that are 
specifically directed to imports, which we labeled as carbon-related BAMs. To attain our 
objective, we take two approaches: (i) from an international trade law perspective and (ii) 
from an economic perspective. For the legal aspect, we show the obstacles and opportunities 
of carbon-related BAMs to comply with the GATT and WTO requirements.  Whereas, for the 
economic part we take two frameworks into the analysis, first, we model the response of 
countries to an optimal unilateral climate policy and we add carbon-related BAMs as an 
additional policy instrument for the regulator in order to tackle emissions leakage. Second, we 
show, by means of a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, the environmental 
(emissions reduction and leakage) and welfare effects of an exogenous climate policy 
objective that resembles current the international climate policy regime. 
Early contributions on BAMs (in particular taxes) show that they guarantee trade neutrality if 
goods are different taxed in differently regions (Bhagwati, 1973).  In his seminal paper, 
Markusen (1975) applies such border measures on environmental problems and showed that 
import tariffs are part of the optimal policy set for trans-boundary pollution problems.  
Copeland, (1996) generalizes Markusen’s work for variable abatement technologies.  His 
analysis concludes that the affected country should levy a tariff, which varies with the 
pollution content of the imports.  He further shows that even if a country reduces pollution as 
a respond to another country trade policy, the latter should adhere to the import tariff to 
maximize rents.  
Furthermore, Alexeeva-Talebi et al. (2008) shows with a numerical general equilibrium 
model that border measures might improve the efficiency of EU's climate policy and increase 
the competitiveness of European energy-intensive industries.  However, the distinction 
between sectors covered by emission trading and a border tax adjustment scheme and non-
covered sectors has some problematic consequences. A BAM causes a shift in emissions and 
puts a higher burden on non-covered sectors.  Since marginal abatement costs in the non-
covered sectors are higher, welfare effects are ambiguous.  In an earlier contribution Babiker 
and Rutherford (2005) studied the economic effects of border measures under the targets of 
the Kyoto agreement. They show that the introduction of carbon-related BAM is welfare 
improving. 
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The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the legal aspects entailed for 
integrating carbon-related BAMs into the frameworks of the GATT and the WTO. Section 3 
presents our analytical model of optimal climate policy given trade and environmental 
interactions in two regions and how a carbon-related BAM ay help to reduce leakage in that 
context. Section 4 presents our analysis of environmental and welfare effects of carbon-
related BAMs using a CGE model. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
2. Legal aspects of border adjustment measures 
 
 
Border adjustment of domestic measures linked to an emissions trading scheme or a carbon 
tax system is likely to get in conflict with a country’s obligations under the WTO Agreement. 
The most vulnerable characteristics of a carbon-related border adjustment is its link to process 
and production methods (PPMs) which entails  discriminatory treatment of products 
perceived to be like according to the WTO traditional concept of likeness. Moreover, 
irrespective of the PPM-issue, a violation of WTO non-discriminatory rules may incur if the 
collection of a carbon tax at the border requires a very complicated bureaucratic procedure or 
if instead of a carbon tax there is an emissions trading system or the price at which importers 
buy allowances at the border exceeds the prices of allowances for domestic producers of like 
products.2   
As there is a high probability that a carbon-related BAM will be found to violate substantive 
rules of the GATT, there is a need to assess the possibility of justification of the violations 
under general exceptions of GATT Article XX and to find institutional solutions to WTO 
inconsistencies of carbon-related BAMs. The key elements to consider when seeking defense 
under Article XX include: (i) to demonstrate that a measure was taken with the purpose to 
achieve one of the legitimate policy objectives indicated in respective paragraphs of Article 
XX, and (ii) to meet requirements of the Chapeau of Article XX.  
2.1 Nexus between a measure and a legitimate policy objective 
GATT Article XX contains a list of public policy exceptions which apply to substantive rules 
of the GATT. The exceptions in Article XX are limited and conditional and may apply to 
BAMs. For the purpose of carbon-related BAMs, two clauses of GATT Article XX are 
relevant:  
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   We restrict our analysis to import BAMs, for the analysis of other measures such as export rebates 
see Holzer (2010a and 2010b). 
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XX (b) “[measures] necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health”, and 
XX (g) “[measures] relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources…” 
A BAM can be considered under these two paragraphs simultaneously in the case of global 
warming, we may argue that it can affect exhaustible natural resources (e.g. climate, animals, 
forests) and it poses a risk to human, animal and plant life and health (e.g. diseases, high 
temperatures, extreme weather events) –Condon (2009). Justifying a carbon measure under 
paragraphs (b) or (g) of Article XX is not a simple task. A WTO member must perform a two-
tier analysis proving that, first, for paragraph (b), a measure is necessary to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health or, for paragraph (g), a measure relates to the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources and is made effective in conjunction with restrictions on 
domestic production or consumption. Moreover, as we discuss below, under the chapeau of 
Article XX, a measure should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction 
on international trade. 
Proving the necessity of a measure under paragraph b) of Article XX is quite challenging. The 
possible explanation for such a strict threshold is that otherwise it would be quite easy to 
disguise protectionism under the legitimate objective to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health. Determining whether there is a risk for life or health of people, animals or plants under 
paragraph b) is more subjective than determining whether resources are exhaustible or not 
under paragraph g) - Condon (2009). 
The key elements of the necessity test include: (i) the analysis of the contribution of a 
measure to the achievement of a policy objective and (ii) the check on existence of less trade-
restrictive alternatives that provide an equivalent contribution to the achievement of the 
objective pursued. For the measure to be necessary, it does not need to be indispensable or of 
absolute necessity or inevitable. Yet, the contribution to the objective should be significant. 
The recognition of the long-term manifestation of the results of climate policy may suggest 
that, in the context of climate policy measures, the AB would evaluate the contribution of a 
measure to the achievement of a policy objective with less strictness. Furthermore, the 
contribution of a measure into achieving a policy objective has also to be weighed and 
balanced against other relevant factors, such as trade restrictiveness of a measure, the 
importance of the common interests or values protected by a measure. Another important 
consideration relates to the existence of alternatives, for instance, in Thailand-Cigarettes case, 
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the GATT panel, though acknowledging legitimacy of health concerns of the Thai 
government, pointed to the availability of other measures (e.g. a ban on the advertisement of 
domestic and imported cigarettes), which could achieve the health policy goals but, at the 
same time, would be less trade-restrictive than a ban on imports of cigarettes. When 
considering the existence of less trade-restrictive alternatives, a country’s level of 
development and its financial and technical capacities might be taken into consideration (Low 
et al., 2010).   
The most prominent example of successful justification of a measure under Article XX (g) is 
the US–Shrimp case, in which the AB accepted a justification under GATT Article XX (g) of 
a modified US ban on shrimps, based on how shrimps were caught abroad. Thus, relevant for 
carbon-related BAMs is the fact that the measure relates to the conservation of exhaustible 
natural resources abroad and the PPM character of the measure. This case showed that the 
GATT might allow unilateral PPM measures (Hufbauer and Jisun, 2009). 
When arguing under an environmental exception of Article XX (g), the first element to 
consider is whether or not climate may be qualified as an exhaustible natural resource. The 
simplest argument is that the global community would not have given such a priority to 
climate change issues, if climate was not an exhaustible resource (Bacchus, 2010). In US-
Shrimp, the AB explaining the meaning of “exhaustible natural resources” pointed to the 
“contemporary concerns of the community of nations about the protection and the 
conservation of the environment”. Furthermore, changes in climate lead to the depletion of 
other exhaustible natural resources, such as forests, fisheries, and biodiversity. 
The second element to consider is that a measure is relevant to an environmental objective. At 
this point, a carbon-related BAM can be challenged as non-relevant. For the particular case of 
a carbon-related BAM to pass the test on the nexus to the environmental objective, it should 
be proved that a measure is aimed at reducing emissions and preventing carbon leakage and 
not at restoring competitive positions for domestic producers (Bacchus, 2010). However, 
BAMs are traditionally perceived in the WTO as fiscal measures in order to level taxation and 
domestic regulation systems to create equal competitive conditions for domestic and foreign 
production. Thus, it would be difficult to escape a competition-related motive of a BAM.  
Another requirement necessary to meet under Article XX (g) is that the measure related to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources must be made effective in conjunction with 
restrictions on domestic production and consumption. In practice, it means that carbon-
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restrictive measures should be applied to domestic products as well, but there is no 
requirement of equal application of a measure to imported and domestic products. 
2.2 A carbon-related BAM under conditions of the chapeau of Article XX 
After passing the necessity test under Article XX (b) and the “relating to” test under Article 
XX (g), a carbon-related BAM scrutinized under GATT Article XX should also satisfy the 
provisions of the chapeau of Article XX requiring: 
“… that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised 
restriction on international trade…”. 
Provisions contained in the chapeau are an expression of the principle of good faith. In other 
words, the chapeau requires that the measure at issue does not abuse or misuse a possibility of 
exception provided by Article XX and ensures a balance between the right of a member to 
invoke an exception and the rights of the other members under the GATT. Meeting 
requirements of the chapeau seems to be crucial for a carbon-related BAM to be justified 
under Article XX, because recently panels and the AB has moved from focusing on purely 
technical features of a measure to analyzing the overall design of a measure (Van Calster, 
2008). Moreover, the requirement for trade measures not to constitute arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination is also laid down by Article 3.5 of the UNFCCC. This 
requirement can be interpreted as a requirement to take account of conditions in different 
countries.  
Pauwelyn (2007) argues that the language of the chapeau allows making distinctions between 
imports from different countries for as long as “different conditions”, such as level of 
economic development, prevail in those countries. Quick (2000) argues that in the view of the 
AB, discrimination under the chapeau includes not only the like treatment of different 
situations but also a different treatment of like cases. It is important to note that comparison 
on prevailing conditions would be made not only among all countries which export to the 
country imposing a measure but also among the importing country and the exporting 
countries. 
As follows from the WTO jurisprudence, the AB when testing whether a carbon measure 
constitutes “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail” would likely scrutinize along the following lines:  
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i. Does a country imposing a measure require that its climate policy being copied by 
exporting countries or does it accept and take into account climate policy measures 
previously being taken in exporting countries to combat climate change?  
ii. Does the implementation and administration of a carbon measure satisfy the 
conditions of “basic fairness and due process”?  
iii. Did a country, before imposing a carbon measure, try other, less trade restrictive ways 
to settle the problem, such as “across-the-board negotiations with the objective of 
concluding bilateral or multilateral agreements” to combat climate change? 
For the first line of scrutiny, the US ban on imports of shrimp was originally rejected by the 
AB as one which has an intended and actual coercive effect on the specific policy decisions 
made by foreign governments. The US required that all exporting countries adopt essentially 
the same policy, whereas other specific policies and measures that an exporting country may 
have adopted for the protection and conservation of sea turtles are not taken into account. At 
the same time, an import ban, which was later modified by the US so that it no longer 
required the adoption of essentially the same program but rather the adoption of a program 
comparable in effectiveness to the US one, has passed the AB test as one which allows for 
sufficient flexibility in the application of the measure so as to avoid ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination. 
Such interpretation of the chapeau by the AB might have the following practical implications. 
On the one hand, it could give, say, the US the right to exempt the EU imports from a carbon 
tax, provided that the EU producers already paid the costs of carbon under the EU ETS. On 
the other hand, climate policy measures of China, such as an export tax on energy-intensive 
exports or an improved energy intensity target, should also somehow be taken into account, 
perhaps, through lower carbon tax for Chinese imports. This would require a comparison 
between emission reduction systems and climate policies in different countries, which would 
be a very difficult task, especially when comparisons were made between price-based and 
non-price-based climate policy measures (Low et al., 2010).  
Furthermore, to take account of the conditions prevailing in other countries might also imply 
that a country which imposes a BAM on imports would have to check and insure that the 
products imported from other countries had not already been taxed with a similar tax on 
carbon in their home countries and received no tax rebates on exportation. Otherwise, there 
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would be a problem of double taxation as a consequence of ignorance of conditions prevailing 
in other countries. 
Moreover, the requirement of the chapeau to take account of conditions prevailing in different 
countries might also enable a country imposing a carbon measure to differentiate in strictness 
of a measure between countries based on their development (as conditions in developing 
countries are different from developed countries) and even exempt products of least-
developed countries from a measure.  
For the second line of scrutiny, a WTO adjudicative body may look at the procedure of 
applying a carbon measure, whether it is transparent and non-discriminatory. In the context of 
carbon-related BAMs, it might be important to consider the time given by BAM legislation to 
other countries to respond with “comparable” climate mitigation actions, before their exports 
are targeted with BAMs. It is usually expected that there is some period of time between a 
developed country’s introduction of an emission trading scheme and its imposition of BAMs 
against imports from countries not taking “comparable actions”. This period should be of 
reasonable length so that other countries have the possibility to adjust their resources and 
react. 
Zhang (2009) points to the short “grace period” which US draft climate legislation proposes 
between the establishment of a federal cap-and-trade system and the introduction of an import 
allowance purchase requirement. In his view, the grace period for developing countries should 
be at least 10 years after the US emission trading scheme starts working. To take any 
“comparable actions” within a shorter time-frame would be impossible for developing 
countries, given their limited resources, weak environmental institutions, relatively high 
carbon-intensity of production and much time required for designing and preparation of a 
national cap-and-trade system even for such rich countries, as the EU and the US.   
For the third line of scrutiny, a WTO adjudicative body may check whether a country before 
imposing a unilateral carbon-related BAM made attempts to negotiate on respective climate 
policy actions with all countries concerned on a non-discriminatory basis. It should be noted, 
however, that “serious, good faith efforts made ... to negotiate an international agreement” 
would suffice: the conclusion of the agreement itself is not required. In US-Shrimp (WTO, 
2001), the AB pointed out to the fact that the US had not ratified three multilateral 
environmental agreements related to turtle conservation. This note of the AB raises a question 
in the context of international climate policy: could non-ratification of the Kyoto Protocol or a 
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future international climate change agreement deprive a country of the right to seek 
justification of a carbon measure under GATT Article XX? 
Moreover, Goh (2004) conjectures if a country which is a party to the Kyoto Protocol or a 
future climate agreement would still have to seek multilateral negotiations with the purpose of 
reaching an agreement before imposing a unilateral carbon-related measure under exceptions 
clauses of Article XX. Perhaps, participation in the Kyoto Protocol could count as multilateral 
efforts taken by a country to find a solution to the problem before imposing a measure. It is 
worth noting that an effort to negotiate a multilateral agreement with other countries is an 
obligatory requirement only in disputes (US-Shrimp) relating to paragraph g) of Article XX, 
whereas in disputes falling under other paragraphs of Article XX this requirement is not 
raised (Condon, 2009) 
In sum, the chances of justification of a carbon-related BAM under GATT Article XX 
exception clauses largely depend upon the ability of a measure to meet the requirements of the 
chapeau of GATT Article XX. It is especially important to take into account conditions in 
other countries. In practice, it would mean that the measure needs to be flexible enough to 
treat more favourably imports from countries, which had taken emission reduction efforts in 
any form, and to differentiate in treatment depending on a country’s level of economic 
development. It would also mean that a measure had taken into account the rights and 
obligations of an exporting country under an international climate agreement.  
2.3 In search of institutional solutions to the use of BAMs in climate policy 
Although justification of a BAM under GATT Article XX is not entirely excluded, it will be 
difficult to design and implement a carbon-related BAM in a way consistent with the purpose, 
scope and requirements of Article XX, especially of the chapeau. Furthermore, justification of 
a measure under Article XX can be made each time only through litigation between the 
parties to a dispute in the WTO. This implies that the problem of violation of WTO rules will 
have to be resolved each time anew. Therefore, there seems to be a need for long-lasting 
institutional solutions to the problem of WTO inconsistency of carbon-related BAMs, which 
entails high transaction costs.3 
Proposals have been made to initiate negotiations among the WTO members to reach a 
multilateral understanding or even an agreement on border adjustment of carbon and energy 
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 For the analysis of other alternatives see Holzer (2010b). 
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taxes and permissibility of application of PPM-related measures for environmental and other 
legitimate purposes - Biermann et al. (2003). An alternative approach would be to adopt a 
protocol or resolution on trade-related climate policy measures among the parties to the 
UNFCCC (Hoerner and Muller, 1996). Furthermore, another option would be to establish a 
joint WTO-UNFCCC Working Group on carbon-related BAMs (Abbas, 2008). Whatever 
track is chosen, it seems unfeasible today to create one global super-regulatory forum for 
gradual coordination and harmonization of trade-related instruments of climate change policy. 
Therefore, a partial solution based on bilateral and plurilateral negotiations among countries 
and inclusion of provisions on the use of carbon-related BAMs in free trade agreements or 
economic cooperation agreements seems currently most feasible. Alternatively, countries 
could agree on mutual recognition of climate laws and climate policy actions, which would 
obviate the need for border adjustment. Such bottom-up initiatives of countries could 
gradually embrace the majority of the WTO membership and create a multilateral framework 
for trade-related measures of climate policy. 
 
3. Optimal climate policy and international trade 
 
In this section, we set up a model to analyze the main characteristics of climate policy in open 
economies and explain the mechanisms behind carbon leakage, the efficiency of border 
carbon adjustment as measure against leakage, and the opportunity to manipulate terms of 
trade with climate policy. This analysis helps us understanding the rationale behind the results 
of the simulations that we further present in section 4. In the following, first we explain the 
basic settings of our model, second, we extend our analysis to leakage, and third, we analyze 
the effects of including carbon-related BAMs in our framework.4 
3.1 Basic settings 
We are interested in the interaction between two interconnected regions. These correspond to 
the two main blocks of countries in climate politics. On the one side, the Annex B countries 
(mainly members of OECD), which have binding mitigation targets under the Kyoto protocol. 
On the other side, the Non-Annex B countries that do not have any binding target. Both 
regions are linked through two channels. First, emissions generate a negative transboundary 
externality and since mitigation is a public good this creates an incentive to free ride on the 
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 For further simulations of this framework see Schenker and Bucher (2010). 
 12
others abatement efforts. Second, the two regions are linked through trade in goods and 
border measures might affect the flow of goods. 
We focus our analysis on two types of commodities: A carbon-intensive, dirty good and a 
clean good, which is vulnerable to climate change. We suppose that the production of the 
carbon-intensive good causes an externality and affects the production of the vulnerable good. 
Examples for goods produced in the carbon-intensive sectors are the production of energy 
with fossil fuels, cement or steel. All this sectors are responsible for a significant amount of 
CO2 emissions from economic activities. The output of the carbon-intensive good in region i 
can be denoted as: 
( )i iD D e=             (1) 
where ei are the GHG emissions of region i. As for any other input factor we assume 
decreasing marginal returns of emissions: i iD e 0∂ ∂ >  and 2 2i iD e 0∂ ∂ < . 
The GHG emissions from producing the carbon-intensive good, regardless of the region, 
affect the state of the whole climate system and cause a degradation of environmental quality. 
The second sector, which produces the clean, affected good, uses environmental services as 
an input and has hence to cope with productivity losses from the GHG emitted by the carbon-
intensive sector. Examples are sectors such as agriculture and forestry, which are negatively 
affected by higher probabilities of droughts and increasing climate variability as consequences 
of climate change (IPCC, 2007). 
The production of the clean, affected good Ci in region i can be denoted as: 
 ( )( )i i jC C E e ,e= ,           (2) 
with i j≠ . The output of the affected good sector depends negatively on GHG emissions from 
both regions, neglecting other input factors. As it is the case for GHG, we assume that 
emissions are perfect substitutes in their damage potential, regardless of their origin, i.e. 
( )i j OECD non OECDE e ,e e e −= + . From the discussion above it follows that iC E 0∂ ∂ < . We 
further assume increasing marginal damages with respect to emissions, 2 2iC E 0∂ ∂ < . The 
assumption on increasing marginal damages due to climate change is consistent with most 
empirical findings on the climate vulnerability of societies - e.g Stern (2007) and Nordhaus 
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and Boyer (2000). Furthermore, it influences the production possibility frontier (PPF) of the 
regional economies. As shown by Baumol and Bradford (1972), market externalities might 
often cause non-convex production sets, which aggravate the application of standard 
microeconomic tools. The above discussed properties of the production function ensure that 
the production set is convex.  
The value of a region's total production can be denoted by a national income function 
( ) ( )( )i i i jG p D e C E e ,e with i j= + ≠
       
(3)  
where p denotes the world market price of the carbon-intensive good. The world market price 
of the affected good is the numeraire. For low levels of foreign emissions, Gi is humped 
shaped, since marginal benefits from emissions are relatively large compared to the damages. 
Then, Gi is increasing until marginal benefits are equal to the marginal damages. Both regions 
simultaneously choose their optimal climate policy. 
 
We define the optimal climate policy as the level of emissions, which maximizes welfare 
within the region. To reach that goal, the climate policy regulator of a region issues ei 
emission permits to carbon-intensive producers, such that regional welfare is maximized. In 
other words: The regulator maximizes the indirect utility function Vi with respect to the 
number of emission permits ei: 
( )( )
i
i i
e
V p,G p,emax .          (4) 
Then the following first order condition has to hold for an utility maximum: 
 
i i i
i
i i i i i i
V D CV p V p ED p 0
e p e G e e E e
 ∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= + + + = ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ 
 .     (5)  
Following Roy's Identity, the domestic demand for the carbon-intensive good ( )iH p,G  is 
defined as ( ) ( ) ( )i iH p,G V p V G≡ − ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ . So we can rearrange equation (5) to 
i i
i
i i i
D C E pp X 0
e E e e
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
+ + =
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
 ,        (6) 
where Xi denotes carbon-intensive net exports of region i. Condition (6) represents the 
standard equimarginal Pigouvian principle, plus a Terms of Trade term. If the domestic 
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demand for the carbon-intensive good is smaller than production, Xi is positive. Thus, 
assuming that ip e 0∂ ∂ < , a net exporting region has to take into account that an increase in 
emissions deteriorates the Terms of Trade.  
We assume that the different countries, which belong to one group, act as one homogeneous 
entity. We focus the analysis on responses of Non-Annex B on marginal reductions of Annex 
B's GHG emissions. This should reflect the current debate about stricter environmental 
policies in Annex B countries and the respective carbon leakage effect in Non-Annex B 
countries. Moreover, assuming that trade considerations play no part and that only the effects 
of the transboundary externality are important (i.e. that i i
i i
D C Ep 0
e E e
∂ ∂ ∂
+ =
∂ ∂ ∂
). Then country i's 
optimal response to a marginal change in country j’s emissions is 
2
i
2
i
2 2
j i i
2 2
i
C
e E 0
e D Cp
e E
∂
−∂ ∂
= <
∂ ∂ ∂
+
∂ ∂
         (7) 
In expression (7), the numerator shows the change in marginal damages of i abates an 
additional unit of emissions. The denominator shows the change of j’s marginal profits form a 
change in its own emissions. We find that the sign of (7) is negative, thus whenever i increase 
its mitigation efforts, j will increase its GHG emissions – i.e. there is leakage. 
3.2 Leakage and trade  
As seen in the previous section free-riding counteracts Annex B's mitigation efforts.  We relax 
now the assumption that Annex B countries (abbreviated as B in the following equations) do 
not affect world market prices, so that Bp e 0∂ ∂ =  does not necessarily hold. Now Non-
Annex B (abbreviated as NB in the following equations) optimal response if Annex B 
marginally reduces emissions is now as follows: 
2
NB NB
2
B NBNBNB
2 2
B NB NB
2 2
NB
C Dp
e eEe
e D Cp
e E
 ∂ ∂∂
− +	 A∂ ∂∂∂ B C
=
∂ ∂ ∂
+
∂ ∂
.        (8) 
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There is an additional term that appears in (8) with respect to (7). The second term in the 
numerator indicates the effect of changing world market prices of the carbon intensive goods 
due to mitigation in Annex B on marginal emission benefits in the Non-Annex B. From the 
international market clearance condition for the carbon-intensive good
( )( ) ( )i j i i
i i
H p,G e ,e D p,e 0− =D D , we can show that: 
( )
NBB B
B B B
B
GY G
e e ep
e
 ∂∂ ∂
−σθ +	 A∂ ∂ ∂∂ B C
=
∂ ε −η Ζ
,         (9) 
where  denotes the income elasticity of the demand of the carbon-intensive good,  is the 
price elasticity of the demand and  stands for the price elasticity of the supply of carbon-
intensive goods.  Furthermore,  describes the value share of carbon-intensive goods in the 
utility function and  denotes the respective market size. It is intuitive and easy to show that 
equation (9) has a negative sign.  Emission taxes or emission trading schemes raise the 
production costs and prices of carbon-intensive goods.  
Note that the elasticities play a crucial role for strengthening of the price change and hence for 
leakage. Higher demand elasticities cause lower price changes, whereas higher supply 
elasticities obviously lead to larger price effects. Annex B’s emission reduction raises the 
price of carbon-intensive commodities. This leads to larger marginal profits, which induces 
leakage.  Hence, relative to equation (7), the numerator is larger, so that, Non-annex B’s 
responds more vigorously on mitigation in Annex B.  
Figure 1 illustrates the previous findings. Because of decreasing marginal damages, Non-
Annex B increases emissions if Annex B intensifies mitigation efforts, since Non-annex B’s 
profits from Annex B contribution to a better climate state.  Further, if mitigation in Annex B 
increases the world market price of carbon-intensive goods, Non-annex B’s has additional 
incentives to raise emissions, since it becomes more profitable to produce carbon-intensive 
goods.  Thus, we find that if Annex B's abatement efforts affect the price of the carbon-
intensive good on the world market, Non-Annex B will raise emissions by more than in the 
absence of those induced price effects. Leakage increases the negative response of Non-
Annex B’s on Annex B's abatement efforts. 
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Figure 1. Leakage and free rider effects 
Note that if ( ) ( )2 2B NB NB NB NBp e D e p D e∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ < ∂ ∂ , i.e. the increase in marginal benefits of 
emissions due to the increase in prices is greater than the change in marginal benefits due to 
increasing emissions, expression (8) can get smaller than -1. Total emissions may increase 
due to a marginal reduction in the Annex B - but such equilibrium might be unstable. 
We define now the leakage rate, i.e. marginal change in Non-Annex B’s emission due to 
marginal changes in Annex B’s abatement policy, induced by commodity price change, 
( )NB B NB NBL p e D e= ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ .  Thus, the leakage rate denotes the marginal change of the price 
due to a decrease of emissions in the Annex B times the marginal increase of emissions in 
Non-Annex B due to the price change and so we get for NBL : 
( )
NB NBB B
NB B B B
NB 2 2
NB NB
2 2
NB
D GD G
e e e e
L
D Cp
e E
  ∂ ∂∂ ∂
−σθ +	 A	 A	 A∂ ∂ ∂ ∂B CB C
=
 ∂ ∂
+ ε −η Ζ	 A∂ ∂B C
 .      (10) 
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Equation (10) indicates that larger marginal profits of emissions ( NB NBY e∂ ∂ ) in the Non-
Annex B cause more leakage. And the higher elasticities of demand the smaller is the leakage 
rate. And obviously the more vulnerable Non-Annex B's carbon intensive sector is, the lower 
is leakage. We see as well that increasing market sizes reduced leakage. 
As some authors have shown (e.g. Kennedy, 1994), imperfect competition causes a strategic 
interaction of environmental policies between countries.  In the presence of leakage have 
countries an incentive to set CO2 taxes below the Pigouvian level to capture additional rents.  
This environmental dumping effect additionally tempers the ability of climate policy 
instruments to internalize the pollution problem.  
3.3 Optimal climate policy and carbon-related BAMs to Combat Leakage  

We analyze the effect of border carbon adjustment on carbon-intensive goods and then we 
discuss if BMA has the potential to increase the efficiency of unilateral climate policy in open 
economy regimes. Since the representation of production technologies is as simple as possible 
in our model, we do not distinguish between different production methods within a region, 
hence we simply assume that the tax rate by which an imported carbon-intensive good is 
levied, is based on the domestic carbon intensity. In contrast to a pollution content tariff as in 
Copeland (1996), the tariff level does not depend on the carbon content of the imported good 
itself and the production technology abroad. This reduces the policy efficiency of the tariff, 
since abatement efforts of the exporters do not directly reduce the tariff.  
For the analysis of BAMs we concentrate on the case where only Annex B's policy actions 
influence prices, whereas the Non-Annex B takes them as given. We extend then the model 
by Annex B's imposition of a border tax Bτ  on imported carbon-intensive goods. We assume 
that Non-Annex B countries are net exporters of carbon-intensive goods. The exports to 
Annex B are taxed on the border. The first order condition for the optimal emission level in 
Non-Annex B is now as follows:  
( )( )NB NB NBB B
NB NB NB
H X C Ep p e 0
e e E e
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
+ − τ + =
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
,      (11) 
where NB NH e∂ ∂  denotes the change in domestic demand for carbon-intensive goods in Non- 
Annex B if own emissions marginally change, and NB NX e∂ ∂  denotes the respective change 
in net exports. The implementation of carbon-related BAMs in Annex B countries affects the 
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first order condition of Non-Annex B countries. Marginal profits from emissions are now split 
up in benefits from domestic consumption and in profits from exports. The higher the foreign 
tariff, the smaller the marginal profits from carbon-intensive exports and hence from 
emissions. 
A small rearrangement of the expression (11) and using of the implicit function theorem leads 
to the following response of Non-Annex B’s on a marginal reduction of Annex B's emissions:  
2 2
NB NB NB NBB
B2
B NB B NBNB NB BNB
2 2 2
B NB NB NB
B2 2 2
NB NB
C Y X Xp
e e e ee e ee
e D C Xp
e E e
 ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂τ∂
− + − − τ	 A∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂∂ B C
=
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
+ − τ
∂ ∂ ∂
 .    (12) 
We observe three additional terms in the marginal response expression (12), which are of 
importance: (i) ( ) ( )B B NB Ne X e∂τ ∂ ∂ ∂  is the tax rate effect of the border measure. If Annex 
B’s marginally reduces his emissions, its carbon-intensive industry produces more carbon-
efficiently. Since the assessment basis of the tax rate depends on Annex B's production 
technology, Bτ  is increasing. This reduces the profits from Non-Annex B's carbon-intensive 
net-exports and hence the incentive to respond with an expansion of GHG emissions. (ii) The 
term ( )2 NB NB Be eτ ∂ τ ∂ ∂  captures changes in net-exports due to a decrease in Annex B's 
emissions. A reduction in its emission affects only the demand side of the net-export balance 
and is only of second order importance. We ignore therefore this effect for the further analysis 
and draw our attention on additional terms in the denominator. If we again neglect demand-
side effects, we can state ( ) ( )2 2 2 2B NB NB NB NBX e Y eτ ∂ ∂ = τ ∂ ∂ . It now becomes obvious that 
the border measure reduces the marginal profits from emissions for the Non-Annex B 
countries and hence reduces negative leakage incentives.  
Then, assuming that the Non-Annex B region is a net-exporter of carbon-intensive goods and 
that the changes in climate policy do not affect the demand side of the trade balance carbon-
related BAMs reduce the negative response of Non-Annex B on a marginal change in A's 
GHG emissions.  
If we neglect demand-side effects on the trade-balance for carbon-intensive good, then, 
( )2B NB NB BX e e 0τ ∂ ∂ ∂ = , ( ) ( )B B NB NB B B NB NBe X e e Y e 0∂τ ∂ ∂ ∂ = ∂τ ∂ ∂ ∂ > , and 
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( )2 2B NB NBX e 0τ ∂ ∂ = . This reduces the numerator and enlarges the denominator compared to 
the marginal response on equation (8). Hence, in a regime, where Annex B imposes border 
taxes to Non-Annex B's carbon-intensive exports, the latter responds to a marginal reduction 
in Annex B's emissions with a less pronounced emission increase than in absence of border 
measures.  
The numerator in equation (12) on the right hand side shows the limitation of carbon-related 
BAMs to combat leakage. While mitigation in Annex B influences the world market price and 
hence the total production of the carbon-intensive goods in Non-Annex B 
( )B NB NBp e Y e∂ ∂ ⋅∂ ∂ , the import tariff affects only Non-Annex B's net exports 
( )B B NB NBe X e∂τ ∂ ⋅∂ ∂ . Hence, the bigger the export share of the Non-Annex B's carbon-
intensive production, the more effective is carbon-related BAMs.5 
To examine full general equilibrium effects and to get a quantitative assessment of the effects, 
we turn now our attention to the numerical model. Annex B profits from a better 
environmental quality, because the incentive of Non-Annex B to increase emissions is smaller 
than without import tariffs. But at the same time, Annex B suffers from terms of trade 
changes, depending on trade patterns carbon-related BAMs is only a credible threat, if Non-
Annex B is convinced that the Annex B profits in terms of welfare from the measure. 
However, welfare effects are not captured in our analytical model. We analyze this issue in 
section 4 by means of a computable general equilibrium model with a more detailed 
disaggregation concerning production sectors and regions. 
4. General equilibrium analysis 
 
In this section we analyze the environmental and economic effects of leakage and the 
introduction of carbon-related BAMs in our framework. First, we describe the main features 
of the CGE model (GEMINI-E3) that we use on our analysis. Second, we describe our 
reference scenario. Third, we present the scenarios that we tested and the main results 
stemming out from them. Finally, we present how we introduce carbon-related BAMs in our 
model and the main effects that this have on leakage and welfare. 
                                                          
5
  A possibility to address this problem would be the implementation of export subsidies on carbon 
intensive goods in the policy implementing region. However, as mentioned in the introduction, we 
neglect this policy option in this paper. 
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4.1 Description of the model 
GEMINI-E36 is a multi-country, multi-sector, recursive computable general equilibrium 
model comparable to the other CGE models (GREEN, EPPA, MERGE, Linkage, WorldScan) 
built and implemented by other modeling teams and institutions, and sharing the same long 
experience in the design of this class of economic models. The standard model is based on the 
assumption of total flexibility in all markets, both macroeconomic markets such as the capital 
and the exchange markets (with the associated prices being the real rate of interest and the 
real exchange rate, which are then endogenous), and microeconomic or sector markets (goods, 
factors of production). 
The model is built on a comprehensive energy-economy dataset, the GTAP-6 database 
(Dimaranan, (2007), that incorporates a consistent representation of energy markets in 
physical units, social accounting matrices for each individualized country/region, and the 
whole set of bilateral trade flows. Additional statistical information accrues from OECD 
national accounts, IEA energy balances and energy prices and IMF Statistics. Carbon 
emissions are computed on the basis of fossil fuel energy consumption in physical units, 
carbon emissions that are not linked to energy combustion, like CO2 emissions coming from 
chemical reaction in cement clinker production, are not taking into account. But non-CO2 
greenhouses gases emissions are included in the model, for example the methane released 
during coal mining is taken into account.  For the modelling of non-CO2 greenhouse gases 
emissions (CH4, N2O and F-gases), we employ region- and sector-specific marginal 
abatement cost curves and emission projections provided by the Energy Modelling Forum 
within the Working Group 21. 
The nomenclatures - breakdowns by country/region and by sector/product - are framed 
according to the general context and the targets of each study. For the present analysis, it 
appeared convenient to disaggregate the main European Union into 6 entities (the 5 most 
important economies and the rest of the EU) and to retain a nomenclature of 18 
products/sectors, with 3 sectors of fossil energy, 6 in the ETS or energy intensive sectors and 
9 in the Non-ETS, according to Table 1. We assume that the ETS sector encompasses all of 
the sectors listed in Table 1. Due to data limitations and to the constraints coming from the 
initial sectors' classification of GEMINI-E3, we note that this formulation does not exactly fit 
                                                          
6
 All information about the model can be found at http://gemini-e3.epfl.ch, including its complete 
description. 
 21
the EU directive, because: (i) some sectors are in both the ETS sector and in the non-ETS 
sector; and (ii) within a given sector, some firms under the eligibility threshold should not be 
accounted in the ETS subgroup. 
Table 1. Dimensions of the GEMINI-E3 Model 
 
OECD Countries Sectors participating to the ETS 
Germany (DEU) Petroleum Products 
France (FRA) Electricity 
United Kingdom (GBR) Mineral Products 
Italy (ITA)  Chemical, rubber, Plastic 
Poland (POL) Metal and Metal products 
Rest of European Union (EUR)  Paper products publishing 
Japan (JAP)   
USA (USA) Other sectors 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand (CAZ)  Coal 
 Oil 
non OECD Countries Gas 
Russia (RUS)  Agriculture 
India (IND) Forestry 
Brazil (BRA) Transport nec 
China (CHI) Sea Transport 
Rest of the World (ROW) Air Transport 
 Consuming goods 
 Equipment goods 
 Services 
 Dwellings 
 
4.2 The reference scenario 
The reference scenario, also called business as usual (BAU), corresponds to a situation where 
no climate change policy is deemed necessary. Table 2 summarizes the projected annual GDP 
growth for each region. The World GDP growth will converge in 2030 to 2.8% per year. The 
growth would be greater in developing and emerging countries. Our price assumptions 
assumes that oil price reaches 80 US $ per barrel in 2030. 
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Table 2. GDP Growth in the BAU scenario (%) 
 
 2010-2006 2020-2010 2030-2020 
Germany 2.0 1.7 1.5 
France  2.4 2.4 2.1 
United Kingdom 2.6 2.3 2.1 
Italy  1.7 1.9 1.7 
Poland  4.3 4.6 3.9 
Rest of European Union  3.5 3.1 2.4 
Japan  2.2 1.5 0.4 
USA 3.9 2.1 2.1 
Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand  
2.9 2.2 1.2 
Russia  5.9 5.4 5.6 
India  4.2 3.7 3.0 
Brazil  8.6 8.1 6.5 
China  9.6 6.3 5.2 
Rest of the World 4.7 3.9 3.0 
World 3.9 3.3 2.8 
 
Targets in climate policies are defined relative to a base year for developed countries. The 
base years have been indicated in the commitments of the countries (see Table 3). For 
developing countries, the base year is 2005. Currently climate policies are characterized by 
what is commonly called a fragmented regime. Different countries of Annex 1 were 
individually engaged in the implementation of various measures (taxes, standards, incentive 
program, etc.) that result in a set of carbon prices (explicit or implicit) that have little chance 
to converge toward a common value. Only the EU ETS market does represent a successful 
attempt to reach a common price for CO2 for a set of economic sectors in different countries. 
This fragmentation may eventually hinder the development of more ambitious policies and 
lead to very high disparities in CO2 prices. Furthermore, according to economic theory this is 
a source of inefficiency, so there is real gain to make these prices converge to a single price 
(Tirole, 2009). The convergence of these prices necessitates a generalization of the ETS from 
European countries to other countries in Annex 1 and further, to developing countries. The 
assumption of the study reported here, is that starting in 2020, a global market for CO2 is in 
place leading to a single price for CO2. Trading is set up to exchange rights that are equal to 
the commitments of each country. This assumption represents the best case for achieving cost 
effectiveness, even though it does not imply necessarily a global market accessible to all 
(household, business, government). Multiple markets (ETS Global, CDM, carbon market 
between nations, national tax, etc.) are also possible, provided permeability and monitoring 
are carried out effectively enough to get a single world price. 
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Table 3. Base year reference emissions (all GHG) 
 
 
In this set of simulations, the quotas allocated within EU are based on the Population in 2001. 
For industrialized countries, the commitments or proposals made for 2020 and 2050 have 
been retained (see Table 4). For the intermediate years, the target is obtained by linear 
interpolation. No international market for tradable emission permits is established before 
2020. After 2020 one assumes that an international tradable permit market is gradually 
established, leading to a single price for carbon.  
Table 4. GHG emission abatement commitments (%) 
 
 
 
 
GEMINI-E3 includes 6 European country separately, and assumes that until 2020 Europe will 
implement the energy-climate package, which means two CO2 price within the European 
Union: (i) a common carbon price in ETS sector; and (ii) another common CO2 prices within 
non-ETS sectors, on the basis of allowances specified in the EU-directive on energy and 
climate. Moreover, starting from 2021 one assumes the participation of the European Union in 
a global market for CO2. The "burden sharing" of each country must then be defined and be 
negotiated taking into account the overall objective of -75% in 2050 compared to 1990 level. 
In this study, the scenarios assessed in the present study assume that the burden sharing 
between European countries is based on the population of each member. 
 Year Emissions in Gt 
CO2-eq 
Source 
EU 1990 4244 UNFCC exluding LULUCF 
USA 2005 7107 UNFCC exluding LULUCF 
Australia 2000 495 UNFCC exluding LULUCF 
Japan 2005 1358 UNFCC exluding LULUCF 
Canada 2006 721 UNFCC exluding LULUCF 
Russia 1990 3326 UNFCC exluding LULUCF 
China 2005 6739 WEO + estimation EPA 
India 2005 2054 WEO 2005 + estimation EPA 
Brazil 2005 1011 indicators OMD UN + estimation EPA 
ROW 2005 11973 IEO2009 + estimation EPA 
 Year 2020 2050 
EU 1990 20-30 75 
USA 2005 17 80 
Australia 2000 5-25 60 
Japan 2005 15 - 
Canada 2006 20 65 
Russia 1990 20 50 
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4.3 Description of scenarios and main results 
In this section we describe our scenarios, present the main results from them and assess the 
effect of leakage.  
• Description of scenarios 
We analyze five scenarios, in Scenario 1 (Failure of Negotiations), countries prefer to 
emphasize their national interests. The USA abandons their climate policy objectives. Canada, 
Australia and Japan eventually join the USA. Only EU meets its commitments of -20% in 
2020. However, in 2020, the effects of global warming are evident and thus it revives the 
negotiations. Then, USA, Japan, Canada and Australia decide to reach -20% in 2030 (relative 
to 2005). The rest of the World does not commit to a binding objective. As regards the 
European carbon market, we assumed that, within the EU, a market of emission permits is 
introduced at national level to arrive at a single CO2 price for non-ETS sectors. Two CO2 
prices coexist for an ETS sector and another for non-ETS sectors. In Scenario 2 (minimum 
agreement in OECD countries), we assume that industrialized countries (except Russia) fulfil 
their commitments in 2020 and set up, gradually from 2021, an international market for 
emission permits to fulfil commitments consistent with the goals of industrialized countries 
for 2030. Russia and other countries have no meaningful climate policy until 2030.  
Scenario 3 (agreement with OECD and Russia) is practically the same as Scenario 2 with the 
exception that Russia joins the OECD efforts to tackle climate change. Scenario 4 (G20 
agreement) is an extension of Scenario 3 to include major industrialized countries, but with 
the addition of China, India, Brazil (BRIC block). Countries agreed to set up from 2020 an 
international market for emission permits. From 2020, China and India are allocated quota as 
150% of their 2005 emissions, and Brazil 120%. For industrialized countries, quotas are equal 
to objectives consistent with their goals for 2050, the European Union deciding to -30% in 
2020 given the participation of China, India and Brazil to the agreement. China, India and 
Brazil participate to the international carbon market. A restriction is imposed on the volume 
of permits they can sell during the first years (10% of their quotas), this restriction is 
gradually removed and trade is unlimited in 2030. Finally, Scenario 5 (global agreement) all 
countries participate in an agreement following the lines of Scenario 4. However, from 2020, 
the Rest of the World obtains a quota equal to 120% of their 2005 emissions. China, India and 
Brazil and the Rest of the World participate to the international carbon market. A restriction is 
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imposed on the volume of permits they can sell during the first years (10% of their quotas), 
this restriction is gradually removed and trade is unlimited in 2030. 
•  Main results of the scenarios 
This section presents the main results of the scenarios. Figure 2 presents the GHG emissions 
in the different scenarios. Only the scenarios 4 and 5 lead to a decrease of GHG emissions, 
this result shows the importance of the integration of emerging and developing countries in 
the climate change policy. 
 
Figure 2. World GHG emission in MT C equivalent 
 
 
 
We present in Table 5 the CO2 price in 2020 and in Table 6 the CO2 price for 2025 and 2030. 
In the scenario 1, the price of the ETS would be equal to 32 € in 2020 and 73 € for the non-
ETS. In the scenario 2, the integration of other OECD countries (USA, Japan, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand) leads to a further decrease of world energy demand and therefore 
a steeper decrease of energy prices (mainly for crude oil and natural gas), this requires an 
increase in the price of CO2 in the non ETS sector for European countries (the price reaches 
83 €), but not in the ETS sector where coal is the main fossil energy consumed. For non 
European countries the CO2 price is around 40 € in the scenario 2 for the year 2020. Scenario 
3 does not modified the CO2 price because the commitment of Russia (-20% in 2020 in 
respect to 1990 levels) is already reached in the baseline. In scenario 4 and 5 the only 
difference concerns the European countries, which decides to reach a more stringent 
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commitment (-30% in 2020) this requires an increase of the CO2 price in the ETS (the price is 
now equal to 90 €) and in contrary a decrease of the CO2 price in the other sectors. The raison 
is that the increase of electricity prices due to the important increase of the ETS price induces 
a decrease of energy consumption in all sectors and of course a decrease of CO2 emissions, 
the prices required to reach the new CO2 target is therefore less important. 
 
Table 5. Price of CO2 in 2020 (in € 2005) 
 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 
EU      
ETS price 32 33 33 90 90 
Non ETS price 73 83 83 71 71 
USA - 37 37 37 37 
Japan - 34 34 33 33 
CAZ - 44 44 44 44 
Russia - 0 0 0 0 
 
     
 
After 2020, the implementation of international tradable permits leads to a unique CO2 price. 
The table 6 gives this price in 2025 and 2030. It is important to highlight that when the 
emission abatement increases with a greater participation of regions the CO2 price decreases 
over this period. This is due to the lower CO2 abatement of emerging and developing 
countries. 
 
Table 6. Price of CO2 permit in 2025 and 2030 (€2005) 
 
Year Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 
2025 28 84 64 19 13 
2030 83 168 131 39 23 
 
• Leakage  
We have computed the leakage in the different scenarios. In our analysis, we consider leakage 
as equal to the increase of GHG emissions in the regions where are not binding by any 
commitment. In Table 7, we present the leakage in millions tons of carbon and in percentage. 
The leakage ratio is estimated in the worst case (Scenario 1) to 12% in 2030 concerning CO2 
emissions. Of course when we increase the participation in the climate agreement this reduces 
the leakage effect and conducts in Scenario 5 to a leakage equal to 0. Furthermore, we 
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observe that when the agreement encompasses the main emerging countries (Brazil, Russia, 
India and China) the leakage could be reduced to very low level, 3% in 2030. We find that the 
leakage ratios that we present in Table 7 are in line with the numbers from the literature (e.g. 
Paltsev, 2001; Babiker and Rutherford, 2005; Metz et al., 2007) 
Table 7. Abatement and leakage in Mt C 
 
 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 
GHG 
Emissions 
     
   2020 
 
  
Abatement 349 1204 1206 1346 1346 
Leakage (total) 43 96 83 86 86 
Leakage (%) -12 -8 -7 
 
-6 -6 
   2030 
 
  
Abatement 1773 2231 2559 4739 5038 
Leakage (total) 154 169 187 97 0 
Leakage (%) -9 -8 -7 -2 0 
      
CO2 emissions      
   
 
2020 
 
  
Abatement 271 930 916 1049 1049 
Leakage (total) 43 108 94 100 100 
Leakage (%) -16 -12 -10 -10 -10 
   
 
2030 
 
  
Abatement 1490 1935 2186 4107 3940 
Leakage (total) 172 194 187 106 0 
Leakage (%) -12 -10 -9 -3 0 
 
In the following section, we assess the effects of using carbon-related BAMs to tackle 
leakage. The introduction of border adjustment measures will be done within the scenario 2 
which suppose that only industrialized countries undertake GHG emission reductions. Table 8 
presents in the case of the scenario 2 the source of leakage at the regional and industrial level. 
BRIC countries represent 45% of the leakage and energy intensive industries (including 
refined petroleum industries and electricity generation) amounting to 81% of the increased 
emissions. 
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Table 8. Leakage in Gt C by region and sector in scenario 2 in 2030 
 
Sector Russia Brazil India China ROW Sum 
Coal  0 0 0 -3 0 -3 
Oil  0 0 0 0 -2 -2 
Gas  0 0 0 0 -4 -3 
Petroleum products 1 6 2 2 35 45 
Electricity  1 16 5 10 26 58 
Agriculture  0 0 0 0 1 0 
Forestry  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mineral products 0 1 0 3 7 12 
Chemical, rubber, plastic 1 3 1 5 14 24 
Metal and metal products 1 3 1 5 6 17 
Paper products publishing 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Transport nec 0 1 1 3 4 10 
Sea transport 0 0 0 1 1 3 
Air transport 0 1 0 1 0 2 
Consuming goods 0 0 0 -1 1 0 
Equipment goods 0 0 0 0 1 2 
Services  0 0 0 1 3 5 
Dwellings  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Households  0 1 3 0 11 24 
Sum 5 32 14 37 106 194 
 
4.4 Border Adjustment Measures 
We have simulated two different BAMs: (i) an introduction of tariffs to imports and (ii) the 
inclusion of imports in the domestic permit trading schemes. We focus our assessment on the 
scenario 2 to analyse the impacts of these instruments. The following simulations will 
suppose the implementation of BAMs and will be compared to the scenario 2 without any 
corrective measure 
• Tariff protection 
We first assume that there is a tax on import based on direct CO2 content. We suppose that in 
OECD countries a carbon price is imposed on imports coming from non-OECD countries and 
that this carbon price is based on the price supported by domestic firms. Each OECD 
government collects their duties. The CO2 content used to determine the tax is based on the 
fossil energy consumed by firm in non-OECD countries.  
,β
α =
D j ij ri
r i
r
En
XD
,           (13) 
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where α i
r
 is the CO2 content of good i produced in region r, β j  the CO2 content of energy j, 
,j i
r
En
 
the energy consumption in toe by sector i in energy j and i
r
XD  the production of sector i 
in region r. 
The price of imported good i in region r coming from region t is the following: 
,
* 2 = +α ×	 A
B C
i i i it
r t t r r
r
exPimp pd Tco
ex
,       (14) 
where ex is the exchange rate, pd the production price and Tco2 the carbon tax. 
Second, we assume that there is a tax on import based on direct and indirect CO2 content. 
Hence, we take into account not only direct emission but also indirect emissions representing 
the carbon content of goods used as intermediate input. The coefficient α i
r
 is now computed 
by the following equation: 
, ,
,
β + α
α =
D Dj i k i kj r t t
j k ti
r i
r
En MA
XD
,        (15) 
where ktMA  represents the intermediate input in good k used by sector i and produced in 
region t. 
We obtain two sets of results from simulations assuming that the tax on imports is imposed on 
all goods and not only on goods produced by energy intensive industries (EII).  We change 
this assumption an additional set of results, where only the EII are subject to tariff protection. 
Concerning climatic impacts the gain coming from tariff imports ranges from 20 to 50 Mt C, 
which corresponds in the best case to a reduction of 26% of the leakage - as we see in Table 9. 
Table 9. Leakage in Mt Carbon and in % in 2030 
 
 Scenario 2 Scenario 2 + BAM 
based on direct 
content 
Scenario 2 + BAM 
based on direct and 
indirect content 
Scenario 2 + 
BAM based on 
direct and 
indirect content 
(only EII) 
Leakage (total) 194 174 144 152 
Leakage (%) 10 9 7 8 
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We find that with the adoption of a carbon tariff on imports the price of carbon decrease 
slightly (from €168 to €166). In Table 10, we report, respectively, the impacts of BAM on the 
price of carbon and on the welfare cost respectively in 2030. In contrary the impact on welfare 
is important, as in Babiker and Rutherford (2005) we find that the tariff protection is welfare 
improving to countries that impose this tariff and in contrary that the other group of countries 
is worse off7. The reason for this welfare impact is the large implicit rent transfer conferred to 
countries which impose a tax on imports. 
 
Table 10. Welfare cost in % of household consumption in 2030  
 
 Scenario 2 Scenario 2 + 
BAM based on 
direct content 
Scenario 2 + 
BAM based on 
direct and 
indirect content 
Scenario 2 + 
BAM based on 
direct and 
indirect content 
(only EII) 
OECD countries     
Germany  -5.5 -4.4 -3.1 -4.6 
France -1.4 -0.1 0.7 -0.3 
United Kingdom -4.3 -3.4 -2.5 -3.6 
Italy  -2.1 -0.6 0.4 -0.6 
Poland -13.3 -10.8 -9.7 -10.9 
Rest of European 
Union  
-1.3 1.1 2.5 0.8 
Japan  -1.4 -0.5 0.4 -0.6 
USA  -1.9 -1.6 -1.6 -1.6 
Canada, 
Australia, New 
Zealand  
-1.1 -0.3 0.7 -0.5 
     
Non-OECD 
countries 
    
Russia -2.0 -8.3 -10.2 -8.9 
Brazil -0.4 -1.0 -2.0 -1.0 
India 0.0 -0.1 -1.6 0.2 
China -0.8 -1.4 -5.1 -1.0 
ROW -1.8 -3.6 -4.9 -3.5 
 
 
                                                          
7
 We one exception concerning India which has a low welfare gain when the tariff is only applied to 
Energy Intensive Industries. 
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• Inclusion of imports in a national emissions trading scheme 
 
We consider now that exporters have to buy emission allowances for selling their products in 
the regions that have adopted binding commitment of GHG emissions, if of course they are 
not localized in these regions. As our international emissions trading scheme begins at the 
worldwide level in 2021, we suppose that before 2021, a tariff protection is imposed with the 
same protocol described above. We assume also that only Energy Intensive Industries are 
faced to the new rule, the other sectors are exempted to any border adjustment measure. A 
crucial assumption is linked to the allocation rule of the CO2 allowances for the foreigner 
producers, if we suppose that no additional allowances are created, the new demand for 
emission permits will increase sharply the CO2 price. We have retained two assumptions: (i)  
no additional allowances are given, and (ii) allowances are given to exporters which is equal 
in 2021 to 80% of the CO2 content of imports for a reference year which is fixed to 2000, and 
this allocation is equal to 50% in 2050 for this same reference year. 
Table 11 reports the CO2 price and the leakage, whereas Table 12 presents the trading of 
emission permits. In the case where no additional allowances are given the CO2 price 
increases by 50%. The additional demand for permits forced OECD countries to reduce by 
more than 267 millions of CO2 their emissions compared to the scenario 2. OECD countries 
become net sellers of permits and U.S. sell more than half of the demand from the EII 
exporters. The leakage is equal to 157 Mt CO2.  
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Table 12. CO2 permit (€ 2005) and leakage in 2030 
 
 
 Scenario 2 Scenario 2 + import 
in emissions trading 
Scenario 2 + import 
in emissions trading 
+ extra allowances 
CO2 price 
 
168 243 218 
Leakage 
 
194 157 155 
OECD GHG 
abatement 
 
2231 2498 2387 
CO2 buying by EEI 
exporters 
- 267 156 
 
 
Concerning the welfare cost of OECD countries there is two opposite effects of the inclusion 
of imports in the national emission-trading scheme, first, the increase of CO2 price induce a 
increase of the deadweight loss of the taxation; second, the selling of permits to non OECD 
producers create extra revenue. 
 
Table 13. Trading of permits (+ selling – buying) in Mt C in 2030 
 
 Scenario 2 Scenario 2 + 
import in 
emissions trading 
Scenario 2 + 
import in 
emissions trading 
+ extra allowances 
Germany  -53 -32 -41 
France 6 14 11 
United Kingdom -12 1 -4 
Italy  6 13 10 
Poland -3 4 1 
USA 7 144 88 
Japan 16 37 28 
Rest of European Union  2 32 19 
Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand 
31 52 44 
All exporters - -267 -156 
Sum 0 0 0 
 
Finally, the impact is welfare decreasing for Germany, and USA, and welfare increasing for 
the other OECD countries. For non-OECD countries the result of the scenario is of course an 
increase of the costs. When we create extra allowance dedicated to EII imports the increase of 
the CO2 price is less important (30% to be compared to 50%), the impact are similar to the 
previous simulation but with a magnitude less important. 
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5. Conclusions  
We analyze carbon-related BAMs (focused on imports) as potential instruments to reduce 
emissions leakage. We combine an approach from international trade law with an economic 
approach. For the legal aspect we discuss the elements needed to include carbon-related 
BAMs within the current GATT and WTO frameworks. For the economic aspect, we assess 
the effects of leakage and of BAMs to tackle it within an optimal climate policy model and a 
general equilibrium model.  
From our analysis, we can derive three main results. First, from an international trade law 
perspective, we find that the design and implementation of carbon-related BAMs would be 
difficult to bring in compliance with WTO rules and with criteria set for justification under 
GATT general exceptions. Because of intrinsic competition-related motives of border 
adjustment, and because of traditionally symmetric application of border adjustment to 
imports and exports, for the purpose of defence under GATT’s Article XX, it would perhaps 
be more reasonable to apply import carbon tariffs, rather than carbon-related BAMs. 
Furthermore, a carbon-related BAM might be ineffective to foster global emission reductions. 
Foreign producers might adjust their costs respectively and choose to pay a carbon tax or 
surrender emission permits, instead of investing in low-carbon technologies. Moreover, 
exporting countries may take retaliatory measures. 
Second, from the optimal climate policy perspective, we find that leakage indeed is a major 
problem for unilateral climate policies and BCA is an effective instrument to deal with 
leakage. Additionally, we observe that the severity of leakage may be amplified through 
international trade and that BAMs indeed help in reducing such leakage. Third, from our 
welfare analysis, we find that although leakage may be reduced after the introduction of a 
BAM, this reduction is not important. We observe that charging a tariff on imports provides 
better results (in terms of leakage reduction) than forcing exporters to surrender emission 
permits at the border. Moreover, we find that the welfare effects are not always unambiguous. 
We show that, when implementing a tariff, welfare in OECD countries is increased (although 
to a small extent), whereas when exporters have to buy permits at the border the effects on 
OECD countries is not always positive for all OECD countries. Thus, following our optimal 
climate policy assessment, we may argue that carbon-related BAMs would not represent a 
credible threat to involve other actors in the international climate regime.   
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Finally, as future lines of research, we propose to assess what will be the effects of alternative 
BAMs (e.g. carbon-intensity standards and export rebates) under our framework and to 
analyze alternative institutional arrangements (e.g. a combined UNFCCC/WTO framework or 
bilateral agreements) to tackle both the issues of climate change, in general, and of emissions 
leakage, in particular. 
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